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Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe: 










Demographic research has drawn attention to the multiple ways in which changes in 
mortality and childbearing have produced major shifts in intergenerational family 
structures. The aim of this article is to contribute to this body of research by analysing 
the data from the Generations and Gender Surveys for nine European countries. In the 
study, data pertaining to the availability of ascending (parents and grandparents) and 
descending (children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren) kin of each respondent 
are combined to shed light on the family structures in which individuals are embedded 
at various stages of their lives. The findings provide new insights into the ways in 
which various past and present demographic regimes come together to form specific 
intergenerational family constellation patterns across Europe. This convergence may 
yield family constellations of very similar “heights” in countries with sharply 
contrasting demographic histories. The results also indicate that certain demographic 
scenarios may halt or temporarily reverse the trend towards the further vertical 
extension of family constellations. 
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1. Introduction 
Intergenerational support within the family is recognised as being fundamentally 
important to individual well-being and social integration. Research investigating the 
foundations of changes in the family has drawn attention to ways in which variations in 
mortality, fertility, and nuptiality translate into major shifts in the number and 
configuration of ties through which intergenerational support is provided and received 
(Watkins, Menken, and Bongaarts 1987; Uhlenberg 1996; Murphy and Grundy 2003). 
According to a widely accepted theory of family change during the transition to the 
modern demographic regime, declines in mortality and fertility have resulted in the 
verticalisation of family structures: i.e., more generations are alive, but with fewer 
members in each generation (Bengtson, Rosenthal, and Burton 1990).  
Demographic transition theorists (Notestein 1953; Kirk 1996) expected the shift 
towards the modern demographic regime to result in a new equilibrium between low 
levels of mortality and fertility. However, developments have not occurred as forecast. 
Following a brief respite provided by the post-war baby boom, fertility resumed its 
decline and fell below replacement levels (Frejka and Sardon 2004; Frejka and Sobotka 
2008). Although the 2000s have witnessed some recovery, fertility remains under 
replacement in virtually all of the countries of Europe (Goldstein, Sobotka, and 
Jasilioniene 2009). With regard to longevity, predictions about stagnation in life 
expectancy have not been realised, and mortality has continued to decline even in 
countries with the highest life expectancy (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002; Vallin and Meslé 
2009).  
These developments continue to transform family constellations, with significant 
implications for well-being and social integration, but the nature and extent of these 
changes is relatively poorly charted. A major reason for this lack of knowledge is 
related to the availability of data, since a comprehensive understanding of family 
structures cannot be derived from conventional sources of demographic information. 
Measures based on vital statistics are indispensable for describing trends in mortality 
and fertility; however, they appear to have limited ability to provide insight into the 
ways in which the different processes interact, affect families, and shape lives. The 
measures based on household units that are prevalent in censuses and surveys usually 
disregard non-co-residing family members.  
Family demographers have devised different strategies for analysing kin networks 
beyond the household. One frequently used approach relies on simulation models that 
provide estimates of kin networks under a specified demographic regime (Le Bras 
1973; Bongaarts, Burch, and Wachter 1987; Smith and Oeppen 1993; Van Imhoff and 
Post 1998). Although simulation methods have important advantages, particularly in 
situations in which observational data are not available, their limitations should not be Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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overlooked. In order to construct the models, researchers need to make assumptions 
about the underlying processes, which could influence the results. This may be a minor 
concern when comparing highly contrasting demographic regimes. But when the 
differences are more subtle, such as the variations across contemporary European 
countries, the dependence of the results on modelling assumptions may become an 
issue. An alternative research strategy draws on observational data from sample surveys 
that collect information on non-co-residing kin (Farkas and Hogan 1995; Grundy, 
Murphy, and Shelton 1999; Dykstra and Komter 2006). The drawbacks of the survey-
based approach typically relate to biases resulting from partial coverage of the target 
population, high rates of non-response, and inaccuracy of reporting. The estimates are 
also subject to sampling variation, and the types of kin on which information are 
collected tend to be limited. 
This article is intended to complement the aforementioned body of research by 
providing an analysis of the newly available comparative data from the Generations and 
Gender Surveys (GGS). Our objective was to examine the variations in 
intergenerational family constellations at the beginning of the 21st century. We 
addressed the following questions: How many generations, in ascending and 
descending directions, surround individuals in contemporary populations? How 
common are vertically extended lineages that consist of three, four, or even five 
generations? How many people are deprived of family, lacking inter- and/or 
intragenerational ties? In answering these questions, the cross-national comparative 
perspective of the GGS made it possible to identify – at the level of individuals and of 
families – the consequences of demographic regimes that are characteristic of particular 
groups of European countries and regions. These issues have become increasingly 
important for policy makers in light of an ageing population: when support from family 
members is insufficient or unavailable, a change in family constellations may shift the 




2. Previous findings related to the demographic foundations of 
family change  
Research into the demographic foundations of family change has identified several 
ways in which change in demographic regimes transforms relationships within and 
across generations. There are numerous studies that show how the transition to low 
mortality has fundamentally increased the “co-longevity” of successive family 
generations (Martin and Culter 1983; Goldman 1986; Uhlenberg 1993; 1996; Schoeni 
1998). Within the same time frame, the fertility transition has substantially reduced the Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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number of children born to the average family. According to Bengtson, Rosenthal, and 
Burton (1990), these mutually reinforcing developments have led to an increase in the 
proportion of families characterised by a “beanpole” structure made up of three, four, or 
even five living generations, but with fewer members in each generation. The shift 
towards this type of family is also referred to as the “verticalisation” of family 
structures, which has two aspects: an increase in the number of relationships across 
generational lines, as multi-generation families become more common; and a trend 
towards fewer horizontal kin ties (Hagestad 2000). 
Although these theoretical premises are widely accepted, relatively few studies 
have empirically examined the change in family constellations during the transition 
from the pre-modern to the modern demographic regime. Using family status life tables 
for the United States in 1800, 1900, 1960, and 1980; Watkins, Menken, and Bongaarts 
(1987) showed that demographic modernisation implies a longer time spent in the roles 
of child, parent, and spouse. Their results indicated that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the rise in longevity has more than compensated for the effects of decreased 
fertility and increased divorce rates over the long term. Post et al. (1997) conducted a 
study that is of particular interest in the context of this article. Their study drew on 
observational data from Dutch genealogical records. For the period 1830–1990, they 
continuously assessed the effect of the demographic transition on the number of kin 
from the onset through to the completion of the regime change. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the results did not reveal a fundamental change in the number of vertical ties over the 
period studied. Despite a decline in fertility, the average numbers of children, 
grandchildren, nephews, and nieces were as high or higher in 1990 as they were in the 
early 19th century, mainly as a result of the sharp decrease in infant and child mortality. 
The number of ascending kin (parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts) changed very little.  
A closer examination of the findings of the Dutch study suggests that the number 
of kin follows a two-stage pattern: at the early stages of the demographic transition, the 
number of descending and lateral kin increases, followed by a decrease at the later 
stages. At the macro level, the birth of the largest cohorts at the height of the transition 
appears to demarcate the line between these two stages. In the following 70–80 years, 
this wave travels from the bottom to the top of the population pyramid, producing a 
complex transformation in family constellations. Although the authors reported no 
measures that would directly address the configuration of family structures, their results 
are at odds with the notion of a straightforward linear trend towards the beanpole family 
structure.
5 The latter probably did not gain momentum until the later stages of 
demographic modernisation, when the effect of falling fertility rates counteracted the 
 
5 Ideally, verticalisation should be expressed as an increase in the ratio between vertical and horizontal family 
ties. In reality, less comprehensive measures that focus on narrower aspects are often used. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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effect of decreasing infant and child mortality. Until that point, the growth in the 
number of lateral ties probably exceeded that of vertical ties; this assumption is 
supported by the increase in the number of lateral kin, which peaked in the 1930s–
1960s (Post et al. 1997). 
As of the 2000s, advanced European countries are already 60–70 years into the 
post-transitional stage of demographic development. The question of whether there has 
been a steady progression towards more vertical family structures during this period 
cannot be fully answered from existing research. Observational studies of 
intergenerational family constellations are relatively scarce, and are often restricted to 
cross-sectional snapshots at specific points in time (Farkas and Hogan 1995; Grundy, 
Murphy, and Shelton 1999; Knipsheer et al. 2000; Dykstra and Komter 2006). In one of 
the few exceptions, Pennec (1997) examined the trends in the probability of being in a 
multi-generation family in France. The study indicated that membership in a four-
generation family became increasingly common among cohorts born between 1920 and 
1950. The upward trend drew its strength from several developments that converged 
and reinforced each other in these generations: a continuing decline in mortality, a 
decrease in childlessness, and a shift towards earlier family formation. It is likely that 
the steep rise in the incidence of multi-generation families reported for France extends 
to other countries that experienced the disappearance of the historical marriage pattern, 
characterised by a high age at first marriage and a high proportion of individuals who 
never marry, as well as a baby boom in the period after WWII. 
A new stage in Europe’s recent demographic history relates to the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT), which has been gradually unfolding since the mid-
1960s (Lesthaeghe 2010; Kaa 1987, 2004). During this transition, the decline in fertility 
levels has been exacerbated by a shift towards delayed childbearing (Kohler, Billari, 
and Ortega 2002). Unlike the baby boom, the new childbearing patterns counteract the 
effects of increasing longevity. The combined outcome of these opposing forces is not 
yet obvious, but there are signs that it may have temporarily reversed the earlier trends, 
at least in some countries. For instance, in a study of the availability of family support 
in Britain, Finland, and France; Murphy, Martikainen, and Pennec (2006) projected that 
delayed childbearing would curtail the upward trend in the availability of ascending kin, 
and result in a decline beginning with the cohorts born in the 1970s. They also drew 
attention to a shift towards reduced availability of descending kin beginning with the 
birth cohorts of the late 1940s and 1950s, which reflected rising levels of childlessness. 
In another study focusing on the United States in the 1990s, Matthews and Sun (2006) 
reported that a smaller age gap between generations, rather than increased longevity, 
accounted for four-generation family lineages. These findings raise the question of 
whether the trend towards a further increase in the number of generations in a family 
should be taken for granted under contemporary demographic conditions. Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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In this article, we examined the generational structure of families in nine European 
countries at the beginning of the 21st century. Against the backdrop of the opposing 
effects of childbearing and mortality, and the persistent diversity of the underlying 
demographic processes (Frejka and Sobotka 2008; Vallin and Meslé 2005), we 
expected to find considerable variation in intergenerational family constellations across 
countries. Under these circumstances, an increase in the number of generations in the 
family, and in the incidence of multigenerational ties, may have become a matter of 
degree, dependent on the effects of competing influences.  
 
 
3. Data and analytical approach 
Our empirical analysis is based on data extracted from national surveys carried out 
within the framework of the Generations and Gender Programme (Vikat et al. 2007).
6 
These surveys enable direct observation of the family ties which link successive 
generations of a family, irrespective of co-residence, as well as various types of 
exchanges that take place as a result of these ties. These kinds of issues can only be 
partially examined by means of other cross-nationally comparative datasets. For 
instance, SHARE (Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe) has information only on 
older age groups; ECHP (EC Household Panel) and its successor, EU-SILC (EU Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions), yield only limited information about family 
members living outside the household; and two rounds of the ISSP (International Social 
Survey Programme) have collected data only on adult generations of kin. Unlike many 
studies of intergenerational family structures that draw their evidence solely from the 
experience of women (e.g., Watkins, Menken, and Bongaarts 1987; Pennec 1997; 
Murphy, Martikainen, and Pennec 2006), the GGS provides information about both 
sexes. 
The results presented in the following sections pertain to the nine GGS countries 
for which the micro-data from the first wave of the survey were available to the authors 
in the fall of 2010. These are Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Romania, and Russia. Although the selection does not include 
countries from the northern and southern parts of the continent, it is considered to be 
reasonably representative of both the historical and contemporary demographic 
diversity existing in Europe. From a historical perspective, the countries cover almost 
the whole spectrum of demographic modernisation, from the vanguard (France) to the 
latecomers (e.g., Georgia and the Russian Federation). With respect to more recent 
 
6 The authors gratefully acknowledge the Population Activities Unit, United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, for permission to use the GGS data for this analysis. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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periods, they feature considerable variation in mortality and fertility regimes, which 
provides an opportunity to examine the interplay between demographic processes and 
family structure. Table 1 in the appendix contains a summary of the characteristics of 
each national survey. Appendix Table 2 presents the key indicators characterising the 
demographic profile of the countries included in the analysis. 
The starting point for the analysis was to define the family network. The GGS 
collected information on the following types of kin: children, parents, grandchildren, 
grandparents, great-grandchildren, partners, and siblings (UNECE 2005). Information 
about family members in each of these roles was collected irrespective of co-residence 
with the respondent. The amount of detail about each type of kin varies with the nature 
of the relationship. More information is available about members of the immediate 
family of the respondent (children, parents, and partners). Information about more 
distant relatives (grandparents, great-grandchildren) is limited to the number of living 
kin at the time of the survey, which provides the common denominator for the analysis. 
With regard to intergenerational ties, the GGS collected information primarily on 
biological ties; information on non-biological ties, independent of co-residence, is 
systematically available only with regard to children (adopted, foster, and 
stepchildren).
7 For that reason, the study is restricted to biological relationships that can 
be linked to patterns of longevity and childbearing. 
We applied the so-called “egocentric” perspective to mapping family 
constellations (Hagestad 2000; Herlofson and Hagestad 2011). In this approach, the 
survey respondent serves as an anchor, and the descending and ascending family 
generations are analysed from his or her position. The age range of the GGS 
respondents (18–79) reduces the bias towards a “top-down” or “bottom-up” 
perspective, which are characteristic of studies focusing on specific age groups. 
Nonetheless, in interpreting the results, it should be remembered that the anchors are 
not representative of the two extremes of the age distribution (children and the 
extremely elderly).  
The analysis was undertaken in two stages. First, we considered the proportion of 
the population who had close kin in descending (children, grandchildren, and great-
grandchildren) and ascending (parents and grandparents) generations. Second, we 
combined the data concerning the older and younger generations in order to highlight 
the generational structure in which individuals are embedded. This approach provided 
us with synthetic measures, such as the number of family generations, the proportion of 
individuals who lack intergenerational family ties, and the generational position of the 
anchor. In addressing these aspects, we sought to map the similarities and 
 
7 Information on non-co-resident stepchildren was limited to children of the current partner. Data on children 
of former partners who were not residing in the respondent’s household were beyond the scope of the survey. Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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dissimilarities in family constellations between the countries and regions of Europe. 
The results were expected to cast light on the ways in which variations in demographic 
regimes with respect to longevity and childbearing converge and produce specific 
patterns of intergenerational structures. The details pertaining to specific variables are 
discussed in the following sections. 
To conserve space, the results have been presented in graphic format. In addition, 
Tables 3–5 in the appendix contain information pertaining to the survey population 
aged 20–79, and three aggregate age groups representing younger (20–39), middle-aged 
(40–59), and older adults (60–79); on the availability of kin, the number of generations 
in the family, and the generational position of the anchor.
 8 In interpreting the results, it 
is important to keep in mind that the study draws on surveys that are subject to bias 
resulting from limited coverage of the target population, non-response, and inaccuracy 
of reporting. The GGP infrastructure project is currently collecting detailed information 
on these issues. To gauge the net effect of some significant biases associated with the 
present study, we compared GGS estimates of the number of children and the 
proportion of childlessness for women, with reports based on demographic statistics 
(Frejka and Sardon 2004; Rowland 2007; Dykstra 2009). In most countries, the surveys 
seem to overreport the proportion of childlessness, while underreporting the number of 
children and the prevalence of descending intergenerational ties. However, based on a 
careful review of the results, we believe that the imperfections of the data do not 




4.1 The patterns of kin availability 
4.1.1 Children 
The GGS revealed a noticeable variation in the availability of children. Among the 
countries included in the analysis, the overall proportion of respondents having at least 
one biological child appears to be lowest in Germany, where only two-thirds (67%) of 
respondents aged 20–79 had children, followed by the Netherlands (69%). At the other 
end of the spectrum, the proportion of adults with children in the Russian Federation 
was 82%, making the percentage of childless respondents almost half as high as in 
 
8 To account for the variation at the upper and lower age limits of the samples, and to ensure better 
comparability between countries, respondents under age 20 and above age 79 were excluded from the 
analysis. A few respondents whose age was unknown were also excluded. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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Germany. Among the remaining countries, France and Hungary had similar levels of 
around 73%; while in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania, the proportion of the adult 
population with children was somewhat higher.
9 
In order to understand the reasons for the observed variations, it is necessary to 
consider several factors that determine the availability of children among the adult 
population, such as the proportion of adults who ever become parents, the timing of 
entry into parenthood, and the levels of child and adult mortality. The contribution of 
fertility patterns is illustrated in greater detail in Figure 1, which shows the availability 
of children for three aggregate age groups. These data revealed that, in most countries, 
85%–90% of the elderly (the 60–79 age group) had at least one surviving biological 
child.  
A similar situation was also found to exist among the middle-aged (40–59), who 
will dominate the older population beginning in the mid-2020s. Only Germany had a 
markedly lower availability of children: it was the sole country among those included in 
the analysis where the proportion of the childless exceeded one-fifth of both the middle-
aged and elderly populations. The latter figure should be treated with caution, as the 
German GGS has been known to overstate childlessness in older age groups 
(Kreyenfeld et al. 2010). The pattern reveals the consequences of the persistence of 
very low fertility; in West Germany, the total fertility rate has been below 1.5 since 
1975, which accords with the mean number of children for the middle-aged population, 
as shown in Figure 1.
10 
 
9 It should be noted that the general measures of kin availability are affected by differences in the age 
structure of the population across countries. We have therefore calculated age-adjusted measures using the 
2005 population of Europe as a standard (Appendix Tables 3–5). The variation in the age structure may 
slightly alter the relative position of individual countries; however, it does not affect the overall pattern.  
10 To assess the impact of restricting the analysis to biological ties, measures of child availability were re-
calculated to include non-biological children. This resulted in a relatively modest decrease in childlessness: 
less than 1% for three countries, 1%-2% for five countries, and slightly more than 2% for one country. In 
France and Russia, non-biological children comprised 11%-12% of all children of 40–59-year olds; the 
proportion was lower for other countries and age groups. Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
















































Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
The measures of child availability for young adults (20–39), unlike the measures 
for the middle-aged and older populations, are strongly affected by the postponement of 
childbearing, which increases the divergence. Whether these larger differentials will be 
reflected in the ultimate level of childlessness for these younger generations hinges on 
the extent to which the postponed births will be recuperated at later stages of these 
cohorts’ reproductive periods. There are indications that the degree of recuperation 
varies across regions and countries of Europe (Frejka and Sardon 2004; Frejka and 
Sobotka 2008), but further exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.  
Compared to childbearing, the differences in longevity across countries exert a 
more limited effect on child availability. This conclusion can be inferred by comparing 
the number of children ever born with the number of those surviving. As the difference 
between these two measures increases with age, the evidence was obtained from the 
oldest respondents, whose first-born children were in their mid-forties at the time of the 
survey (Figure 2). In passing from childhood to middle age, these generations were 
exposed to infant, child, and adult mortality at considerably higher levels than are 
currently observed. Against that backdrop, the difference is quite small between the 
proportion of elderly to whom children were ever born and those whose children were 
still alive. Even in the countries included in the analysis that have relatively low life 
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expectancy (e.g., the Russian Federation), the differences between the proportion of 
elderly with children ever born and surviving did not exceed 3%–4%. However, nearly 
one person in five in these countries had lost a child before reaching his or her 75th 
birthday. 
 
Figure 2:  Kin availability: children ever born and surviving 






















Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
The apparent discrepancy between the sets of measures – the reduction in child 
availability (no more than four percentage points) and the proportion of elderly who had 
experienced the loss of a child (up to 20%) – points to the fact that parents are less 
likely to outlive their children if they have many offspring. On the other hand, despite 
the relatively minor impact on kin availability, the effects of the death of a child on the 
well-being of the elderly should not be overlooked. Paradoxically, it may be the 
decreasing probability of that event that increases the difficulty of the adjustment 




In all of the countries included in the analysis, a majority of adults were found to have 
older family members. Owing to prolonged stagnation in adult mortality in the 
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countries of Eastern Europe, the lowest incidence of parental ties was found, not 
surprisingly, in Romania, Estonia, and the Russian Federation; with 55%, 59%, and 
61% of respondents, respectively, having at least one living parent.
11 The countries 
with the highest prevalence of ascending intergenerational ties were Bulgaria (70%) and 
France (69%). In the remaining four countries, the proportion with at least one living 
parent ranged between 63% and 66%.  
Given Bulgaria’s life expectancy of 69 years for men and 76.2 years for women at 
the time of the survey, with little improvement since the 1970s, the top-ranking position 
of the country may seem surprising. This is partly due to the age structure of the 
population, but it also draws attention to other factors that affect the ties upwards from 
the anchor. It often goes unnoticed in studies of intergenerational constellations that, 
next to longevity, the availability of ascending kin depends on the timing of fertility in 
the parental generation, particularly the age of onset of childbearing, and determines the 
ages of parents relative to their children. Due to a persistent pattern of early 
childbearing for most of the 20th century, Bulgaria was found to exhibit the shortest 
generational distance (26.3 years) between the anchor and his or her parents, which 
offset the relatively low life expectancy. For France, the corresponding distance was 29 
years. Estonia, west of the Hajnal line, displayed the greatest distance between 
generations (29.6 years), which partly explains the country’s low ranking.  
Figure 3 presents a comparative profile of parental ties for young, middle-aged, 
and older adults. It appears that, even under conditions of high mortality, 95% of young 
adults aged 20–39 had at least one surviving parent. In countries that are more advanced 
in terms of the health transition, the corresponding proportion was 98%. Among young 
adults, the largest variation was related to whether one (typically the mother) or both 
parents was still alive. Although the likelihood of having ascending kin was 
significantly lower in the 40–59 age group, three-fifths or more of the middle-aged 
population of contemporary Europe had surviving parent(s). France was at the top of 
the list, with 74% of its 40–59-year-olds having at least one living parent; Russia was at 
the other extreme, with a corresponding figure of 59%. Another characteristic of the 
middle-aged population relates to the shifting proportion between individuals whose 
parents are both alive and those with only one surviving parent: in all nine countries, the 
latter clearly outnumbered the former. This implies that the loss of a parent (typically 




11 As the age-adjusted measures in Appendix Table 3 indicate, the bottom-ranking position of Romania stems 
from the relatively youthful age structure of the population. According to the same measures, the Russian 
Federation exhibits the lowest prevalence of ascending family ties. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 










































Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
Among the population aged 60–79, having a living parent becomes an exception. 
The prevalence of parental ties appears to be highest in France, where 16% of older 
persons had surviving parent(s). In high mortality countries, the proportion did not 
exceed 5%. The observed patterns translate into a spread of about 10 years in the age at 
which the loss of parents occurs in contemporary Europe. As a result, the shift to the 
position of the oldest generation in the family takes place at a markedly different point 
in the course of the anchor’s life. This timing results in differences in the period at 
which the greatest demands are made on adult children, and it will also affect other 




Contrary to popular myth, historical demographic research has shown that, under a high 
mortality regime, relatively few people had a chance to develop ties across several 
generations (Goldman 1986; Wrigley 1977). People usually died before or shortly after 
their offspring became parents, and very high infant and child mortality further 
contributed to a reduction in the overlap of a larger number of generations. It was the 
demographic transition that markedly increased the potential for family relationships 
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beyond adjacent generations. The most prevalent of these historically novel 
multigenerational ties is the link between grandchildren and grandparents. This 
relationship appears to be more complex than that of parents and children. Dependence 
on the behaviour of multiple generations makes its configuration less evident 
(Herlofson and Hagestad 2011).  
In general, ties between non-adjacent generations are less prevalent than those 
between adjacent generations, for obvious reasons: grandchildren can be born only to 
adults who are parents themselves, and whose offspring have reached reproductive age. 
Therefore, about one-third of the population aged 20–79 were found to have 
grandchildren. Across countries, the availability of grandchildren varied from 29% in 
Bulgaria and France to 37% in Russia.
12 However, a large majority of the 60–79 age 
group had grandchildren (Figure 4). The GGS data revealed that on average, four-fifths 
of the 60–79-year-olds living in contemporary Europe have become grandparents. In 
fact, among the older population, ties with grandchildren were shown to be only slightly 
less common than ties with children, as discussed in the previous section. This finding 
underscores the significance of grandparenthood as an essential feature of contemporary 
families after midlife, notwithstanding the particularities of the demographic context. 
Among the countries included in the analysis, Romania, France, and Germany 
exhibited somewhat lower levels (76%–78%). In the remaining countries, more than 
80% of the population aged 60–79 were grandparents, with the highest levels found in 
Bulgaria and the Russian Federation (86% in both cases). At the same time, the mean 
number of grandchildren seems to be independent of the reported rates of prevalence. 
This finding is exemplified by the fact that the country with the highest availability of 
grandchildren among the older population (the Russian Federation) was also found to 
have the lowest number of grandchildren. Similarly, the country with the second lowest 
incidence of grandchildren (France) ranked second highest, next only to Georgia, in 
terms of numbers.  
Compared to the 60–79 age group, the variation in the availability of grandchildren 
across countries reached higher levels among the middle-aged population. At the high 
end, the proportion of grandparents in Russia was 43% of 40–59-year-olds, whereas the 
corresponding figure for Germany was nearly half that figure (22%). In the synthetic 
cohort framework, this implies an approximate 10-year spread in the modal ages of 
entry into grandparenthood, exceeding the variation across countries in the age at onset 
of parenthood. Previous research has provided evidence that age at grandparenthood is 
 
12 The low prevalence of grandchildren in Bulgaria is due to the age structure of the population (Appendix 
Table 3). Age-adjusted measures indicate a slightly lower prevalence of grandchildren for Germany than for 
France. In the current version of the Dutch GGS, the prevalence of grandchildren is lower than that reported 
by Dykstra and Komter (2006) in their analysis of the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS). This 
suggests a problem in transferring the NKPS data to the GGS format. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
closely related to the nature of multigenerational bonds (Barranti 1985; Uhlenberg and 
Kirby 1998). 
 















































Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
The finding that the variation in the availability of grandchildren in the middle-
aged population exceeded the variation in the availability of children among young 
adults suggests that there is a cumulation of demographic patterns across generations. In 
this context, the two countries mentioned above exemplify the outcomes of persistent 
early childbearing and low childlessness on the one hand, and those of late childbearing 
and high childlessness on the other. Furthermore, as France is quite similar to Germany 
in this respect, the cumulation of fertility schedules plausibly plays a more prominent 
role than the cumulation of parity distributions, and seems to be a key factor underlying 
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4.1.4 Grandparents 
In the countries included in the analysis, a relatively small minority of the population 
aged 20–79 had at least one surviving grandparent. In accordance with a “top-down” 
view of that relationship, discussed in the previous section, the lower availability of 
grandparents stems from the restriction of the survey sample to the adult population and 
the exclusion of children and adolescents, among whom the availability of grandparents 
was highest. In Bulgaria and France, the overall availability of grandparents was 
somewhat higher, with 28% and 25% of adults aged 20–79, respectively, having at least 
one surviving grandparent at the time of the survey. In the other countries, the 
prevalence of grandparental ties was considerably lower, ranging from 15%–18%.
13 
Figure 5 provides details of the availability of grandparents in aggregate age 
groups. In all of the countries for which data are available, the ties persist well into 
young adulthood. The proportion of young adults aged 20–39 with at least one 
surviving grandparent was highest in France (61%). In Bulgaria as well, more than half 
(54%) of the population aged 20–39 had ascending ties across two generations. In 
Estonia, Georgia, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Russia, the corresponding 
percentages range between 42% and 46%. Differences across countries in the mean 
number of surviving grandparents follow a similar pattern. It is interesting to note that 
the proportion of young adults with surviving grandparents tends to exceed the relative 
number of middle-aged adults with living parents, as discussed in the earlier sections. A 
particularly pronounced difference can be seen in Estonia and the Russian Federation, 
where the former phenomenon was shown to be more than 1.5 times more frequent than 
the latter. At the other extreme is Germany, where the proportion of young adults with 
living grandparents was slightly lower than the proportion of middle-aged adults with 
living parents. Such variations add to the diversity of intergenerational relationships 
across contemporary Europe.  
 
 
13 The harmonised datafiles of the Hungarian GGS do not include information about grandparents; therefore, 
the data for only eight countries are presented in this section.  Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 

















































Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
A more refined breakdown by five-year age groups, not shown in Figure 5, reveals 
that a large majority of 20–24-year-olds—ranging from 84% in France to 71% in 
Germany—still have living grandparent(s). This pattern indicates that, at present, 
intergenerational ties between grandchildren and grandparents frequently span three or 
more decades. An increasing number of grandparents are now living to see their 
grandchildren grow up, complete their education, start living independently, form 
families, and have children. As noted by Sprey and Matthews (1982), these 





The ties between grandparents and grandchildren connect three generations, but in 
collecting information about great-grandchildren, the GGS data span an even greater 
distance. Among the general population, ties with great-grandchildren are somewhat 
infrequent, since eligibility for such extended intergenerational ties is restricted to a 
fairly small group: i.e., grandparents whose grandchildren have reached adulthood and 
have become parents. For that reason, the overall prevalence of great-grandchildren is 
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limited to 2%–4% of respondents aged 20–79. Across countries, the highest percentage 
is observed in the Russian Federation (4.6%), with Germany and France exhibiting the 
lowest levels (1.9% and 2.5%).
14 The low prevalence is partly due to sample selection, 
since the GGS excludes the population over 80 years of age, who are most likely to 
have great-grandchildren. 
The low prevalence of ties across four generations does not mean that the 
proportion of individuals experiencing these relationships is equally low. After age 60, 
the age-specific prevalence of great-grandchildren increases rapidly, and reaches quite 
high levels in the oldest age groups (Figure 6). In most countries for which data are 
available, 30% or more of 75–79-year-olds were found to be great-grandparents, and to 
have family networks that extend across four generations. The findings pertaining to 
great-grandchildren lend further support to the assertion that demographic patterns 
cumulate across generations.  
 
Figure 6:  Kin availability: great-grandchildren 


















Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
                                                           
14 Estonia and the Netherlands did not collect information on great-grandchildren, and are therefore excluded 
from this part of the analysis. 
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In Figure 6, we find at the extremes of the distribution the same countries that 
exhibited the sharpest contrast in the age of entry into grandparenthood: the Russian 
Federation is at the top and Germany is at the bottom. But instead of a twofold 
difference between the extremes in the prevalence of grandparenthood, the data reveal a 
threefold difference (48% vs. 16% in the 75–79 age group) in great-grandparenthood. 
These results suggest that the timing of childbearing plausibly exerts a stronger 
influence than advances in longevity on the incidence of multigenerational ties.  
 
 
4.2 A synthetic account of the family constellations 
The previous sections presented the findings pertaining to different family relationships 
separately. This approach predominates in contemporary social science, as researchers 
tend to view parent-child relationships and ties to other family members in isolation, 
rather than as part of a longer chain connecting the generations. A comprehensive view 
of these connections requires measures that summarise the patterns across the whole 
spectrum of intergenerational ties. A convenient way to produce such a summary is to 
inventory the generations in the individual's kin network. From a theoretical 
perspective, this reveals the vertical extension of intergenerational constellations, which 
appears to be the main direction in which contemporary families are evolving (Treas 
and Bengtson 1982; Bengtson, Rosenthal, and Burton 1995).  
Figure 7 shows the number of generations in the anchor’s family. Contrary to 
popular belief, the GGS findings indicate that the verticalisation of family ties has not 
(yet) resulted in the dominance of kin networks of four or five living generations. In the 
countries included in the analysis, families consisting of three generations appear to be 
the most common.
15 On average, about three-fifths of adults aged 20–79 were shown to 
be embedded in that type of generational structure. Despite the diversity of the 
underlying demographic regimes, the variation in the incidence of three-generation 
families was relatively small. In most countries, it was slightly above 60% (from 60% 
in France to 63% in Estonia). Germany, at 55%, had a lower incidence of three-
generation families.  
 
15 The data for Hungary and the Netherlands are not presented in this section. The Hungarian GGS did not 
collect information on grandparents, and the current version of the Dutch GGS appears to have a 
harmonisation problem with data on grandchildren.  Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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The majority of the remaining two-fifths of the population aged 20–79 was almost 
evenly divided between two- and four-generation families. The proportion of 
respondents with five-generation families was so small that we included them in the 4+-
generation category.
16 Across countries, the ratio between families with more or less 
complex vertical structures follows a different pattern. In Bulgaria, France, and the 
Russian Federation, four-generation families were found to outnumber two-generation 
families. However, the opposite was true for Estonia, Georgia, Romania, and Germany. 
At the extremes, four-generation families in Bulgaria were more than one-third more 
prevalent than two-generation families, while in Germany, two-generation families 
were nearly twice as common as those with four.  
The least common constellation was the one-generation family; individuals in such 
families are often called solos (Hagestad 2000). Solo individuals lack intergenerational 
ties, but they are not necessarily without family: an overwhelming majority have 
siblings and/or a partner. The incidence of one-generation families was found to be 
highest in Germany, where this structure accounted for 7.8% of the population aged 20–
79; one-fifth of solo individuals lacked family ties along the horizontal axis as well, 
with neither siblings nor partner. The proportion of individuals in one-generation 
families was also relatively high in Romania (6%), which corresponds to the high levels 
of childlessness among the older population of this country (Dykstra 2009). In Estonia, 
France, and Georgia, a lack of intergenerational ties was half as common as it was in 
Germany (3.7%–3.9%). The lowest proportions of solo individuals were found in 
Russia (2.7%) and Bulgaria (1.8%).  
 
 
16 Families with five generations are reported in the GGS. They occur among a small number of middle-aged 
or younger old-aged respondents with three descending generations (children, grandchildren, and great-
grandchildren) and whose parent(s) are still alive. The percentage of such families does not exceed 0.5% in 
any country. The proportion of five-generation families would probably be higher in a sample that included 
children and the very old (Pennec 1997; Van Imhoff and Post 1998). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
Figure 7:  Number of family generations 
























Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 
Despite the noticeable differences described above, the mean number of generations 
varied within a narrow range of 2.9 to 3.0 for most of the countries. This suggests that 
divergent demographic regimes can produce strikingly similar outcomes in terms of the 
height of the family constellation. Among the countries included in the analysis, this is 
best exemplified by comparing France with the Russian Federation. The onset of 
demographic modernisation occurred nearly a century apart in these countries (Chesnais 
1992; Vishnevsky 2006); they represent the demographic extremes that co-exist in 
contemporary Europe. In Russia, the stagnation in mortality that dates back to the 1960s 
grew into an acute health crisis during the societal transition of the 1990s (Vallin and 
Meslé 2005). Male life expectancy fell to 58–59 years, and only in recent years have 
Russian mortality rates shown signs of recovery.
17 In France, on the other hand, life 
expectancy has made persistent gains, and ranks near the top of the EU countries for 
men as well as for women (78.0 and 85.0 years, 2009). The differences in fertility are 
also pronounced. France has one of the highest fertility levels in contemporary Europe, 
relatively close to replacement (with a period TFR of 2.00 in 2009). In the Russian 
                                                           
17 In 2009, life expectancy at birth was 62.8 years for males and 74.7 years for females in the Russian 
Federation (Eurostat 2010).  
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Federation, the period fertility rates have been at the 1.2–1.5 level since the mid-1990s, 
and estimates of completed cohort fertility do not exceed 1.6 in the generations born 
since the mid-1960s (Zakharov 2008). 
Notwithstanding the disparity in demographic regimes, the two countries are very 
similar in terms of the number of generations in the family. The differences in the 
incidence of families with varying numbers of generations do not exceed 1–2 
percentage points, and the mean number of family generations is nearly identical (2.97 
for both countries). The distinction between the generations above and below the 
anchor, not shown in detail, reveals the mechanism underlying this unexpected 
similarity. In France, where the life expectancy is higher, each age group of adults tends 
to have more ascending generations (parents and grandparents). In Russia, however, 
where childbearing has occurred earlier, adults have more descending generations. With 
regard to vertical balance, this indicates that intergenerational family structures in 
France exhibit greater “top-heaviness” relative to the Russian Federation. 
Further differences in intergenerational family constellations relate to the times at 
which particular family relationships are generated or lost. As shown in the previous 
sections, there is considerable variation across countries in the ages at which ties with 
descending kin begin and those with ascending kin end. In the countries with a smaller 
age gap between parents and children, individuals move from the position of the 
youngest to the middle generation at a comparatively young age. According to our 
analysis, this also holds true for the second generational shift, in which individuals 
become the oldest generation in their families following the loss of their parents. In the 
countries with a shorter generational distance, the loss of parents tends to occur at a 
younger age. It follows that the family relationships of individuals in the same age 
groups differ considerably across countries, and that they also interact with age-related 
transitions in other areas of life (education, work, retirement, health, etc.) However, an 
examination of these interactions is beyond the scope of this article. 
These patterns translate into varying proportions of adults in kin networks (Table 5 
in the appendix). Starting from the bottom, the proportion of individuals in the youngest 
generation was found to be highest in Germany (24%) and France (23%). At the other 
extreme, in the Russian Federation and Romania, the number of individuals with no 
descending ties did not exceed 14% and 15%, respectively. The pattern was reversed 
for the oldest generation: the proportion of adults in that generation was smallest in 
France (27%) and greatest in Romania (38%) and Russia (37%). The contrasts observed 
at the top and bottom of the family constellations are mutually reinforcing: the ratio of 
individuals in the oldest and youngest generations varied from 1.2 times in Germany 
and France to 2.6 times in the Russian Federation and Romania. This produces a 
somewhat paradoxical pattern: The countries with relatively bottom-heavy family 
structures had a higher proportion of individuals at the top of their family trees. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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From another perspective, the generations surrounding the reference individual can 
be divided into adjacent (children and parents) and non-adjacent (grandchildren, 
grandparents, and great-grandchildren). The latter constitute multigenerational ties that 
have become increasingly common in the course of demographic modernisation 
(Bengtson 2001). The last section of Table 5 in the appendix shows the relative number 
of adults in families with multigenerational ties.
  18 While the results confirmed a 
relatively high prevalence of multigenerational family ties in contemporary Europe, 
they also revealed a noticeable variation across countries. Interestingly, the country 
with the highest prevalence of 4+-generation families is not at the top of the list. 
According to our analysis, multigenerational family ties were most common in Estonia 
(60%), followed by Bulgaria (56%), France, and the Russian Federation (both 55%).
19 
At the other end of the spectrum, Germany exhibited the lowest prevalence, with only 
42% of adults aged 20–79 having family ties across more than one generation. 
Multigenerational ties were shown to be more common in the younger and older 
segments of the adult population. The prevalence of the multigenerational family 
appeared to be lowest among the middle-aged. 
Our results also indicated that, under the contemporary demographic regime, 
generational gaps in family structures are relatively uncommon. In no country did the 
proportion of adults aged 20–79 who are in multigenerational families, but lack family 
members in adjacent generations, exceed 1%. Such families are typical of older age 
groups in which individuals have lost their children, but have grandchildren. In the 
countries with higher levels of mortality, the incidence of gaps in the generational 
structure was more common, reaching 7%–11% among 75–79-year-olds.  
 
 
5. Summary and discussion of the findings 
The subject of this article is intergenerational family constellations in contemporary 
Europe, based on evidence from the first wave of the Generations and Gender Surveys. 
The authors examined the availability of biological kin in generations above and below 
the reference individuals, independent of co-residence in the same household unit. The 
results indicate that, in the countries included in the analysis, a majority of the adult 
population are members of three-generation families. A smaller proportion – less than 
 
18 Families with multigenerational ties are defined as those with at least one family member in a generation 
non-adjacent to the reference individual; i.e., families with grandchildren, grandparents, great-grandchildren, 
or great-grandparents. 
19 The very high prevalence of multigenerational family ties in Estonia is partially a function of the age 
structure of the population. Age-standardisation brings Estonia’s figure in line with Bulgaria’s. Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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one-fifth of the 20–79-year-olds in most countries – were found to belong to two- and 
four-generation families. Up to 8% were solo individuals, with no ascending or 
descending kin. These results corroborate the overall pattern of the findings from 
various studies of individual countries (Soldo 1996; Pennec 1997; Grundy, Murphy, 
and Shelton 1999; Knipsheer et al. 2000; Dykstra and Komter 2006). 
The comparative perspective of the GGS revealed that there is considerable 
variation in intergenerational constellations. In the previous sections, we have shown 
how developments in the underlying demographic processes come together in families 
and affect individual lives. Our results demonstrate that the influences of longevity and 
childbearing patterns may counteract each other with regard to the height of 
intergenerational constellations and the prevalence of multigenerational families. Our 
results are in line with Matthews’s and Sun’s (2006) findings for the United States, 
which indicated that delayed childbearing may completely negate the gains from 
increased longevity. The analysis also showed that the persistence of relatively early 
childbearing may lead to a high prevalence of multigenerational ties, even at levels of 
life expectancy that are considered to be very low by modern standards. A salient 
finding is that the vertical height of family constellations has become, to a perceptible 
extent, a matter of degree. The average number of family generations, and/or the 
prevalence of multigenerational family relationships, depends on which of these 
competing influences prevails in a particular country. 
Our results support the view that, in contemporary settings, the timing of 
demographic events plays an increasingly important role. In particular, the significance 
of the timing of childbearing is supported by the cumulation of its influence across 
several successive generations. Previous research has revealed the presence of this 
“multiplier effect” with regard to specific subgroups of the population or birth cohorts 
Wachter 1997; Hagestad 2000; Murphy, Martikainen, and Pennec 2006). In this article, 
we have described the “multiplier effect” at the national level. The availability of 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren displays a more pronounced variation across 
countries than the availability of immediate descending kin, which produces a 
polarisation of family patterns between countries with relatively early and late entry 
into parenthood. The trend towards a greater incidence of multigenerational ties has 
clearly increased the importance of the multiplier effect.  
The analysis also draws attention to the effect of parity distribution. Rising levels 
of childlessness inhibit the formation of new family generations, depriving considerable 
segments of the adult population of descending kin. As highlighted by the example of 
France and Germany, levels of childlessness make a pronounced difference in 
intergenerational constellations, net of advances in the postponement transition. This 
corroborates the findings of Ogg and Renaut (2006), who used SHARE data to analyse 
the availability of children and grandchildren among older middle-aged adults. Our Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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results also indicate that the role of underlying demographic processes varies according 
to the direction of intergenerational ties: childbearing patterns exert stronger influence 
on the availability of descending family members, while the effects of longevity are 
reflected in ascending ties. 
The limitations of this study relate to the analytical approach imposed by the 
nature of the kin data collected in the GGS. The study focused on the vertical dimension 
of intergenerational constellations and biological ties. The rise in divorce in recent 
decades has increased the complexity of family networks and the importance of step 
ties (Wachter 1997; Dykstra and Komter 2006). The findings reported in the article 
describe differences in family structures across countries in the mid-2000s. The 
evidence does not provide a direct account of the changes in intergenerational 
constellations as they unfold. Nonetheless, the link between observed family patterns 
and past trends in the underlying demographic processes allows us to trace the plausible 
development of intergenerational families in the major regions of Europe.  
It appears that, until the mid-1960s, changes in mortality and fertility made 
mutually reinforcing contributions to the vertical extension of family structures. In the 
countries west of the Hajnal line, the post-war decades witnessed a pronounced shift 
toward younger childbearing, and, hence, a shrinking of the age gap between children 
and adults. A concurrent decrease in childlessness and a rise in life expectancy further 
added to the incidence of intergenerational ties. In the areas east of the Hajnal line, a 
decline in the age distance between generations was primarily driven by a reduction in 
higher order births, but here as well, demographic developments resulted in a growing 
prevalence of multigenerational ties. 
In the ensuing decades, the trends started to diverge along the boundaries that 
separated the state socialist regimes from the rest of Europe. West of the Iron Curtain, 
family and fertility patterns were increasingly moulded by the Second Demographic 
Transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987). With regard to the 
height of family constellations, the shift towards later childbearing and the rise in 
childlessness began to cancel out the results of the improvement in life expectancy. In 
most of Eastern Europe, the “postponement transition” did not gain momentum until the 
societal change of the 1990s (Sobotka 2004). The dissimilarities between mortality 
patterns also became more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, as the life expectancy 
began to stagnate in the countries of the Eastern bloc. However, the divergence in 
mortality and fertility patterns does not seem to have resulted in a major difference in 
the number of family generations, since the losses in life expectancy could be recouped 
by the shorter age gap between generations and lower rates of childlessness in Eastern 
Europe. 
Given the changes in demographic patterns that we have witnessed since the 
beginning of the 1990s, it is obvious that the intergenerational constellations portrayed Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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by the GGS are subject to further transformation. In light of the results reported in this 
article, the course of future changes should not be taken for granted. The continued rise 
in life expectancy will extend the shared survival of generations, and its influence will 
sooner or later override the opposing effect of delayed childbearing on adjacent 
generations. However, the outcome may not be self-evident with respect to 
multigenerational ties, in which the consequences of such postponement converge 
across three or four generations. It therefore seems reasonable to question whether the 
growth in the number of family generations and the prevalence of multigenerational ties 
is bound to continue in a straight line, independent of demographic scenarios and 
regimes.  
The results presented in this article indicate that the answer may not be 
unequivocally affirmative, especially for a country like Germany, where the number of 
co-existing family generations was found to be appreciably lower than in the other 
countries included in the analysis. Distinguishing between ascending and descending 
family generations revealed that the country’s outlier position stems from the very low 
fertility and high levels of childlessness that have prevailed in the country since the 
mid-1970s. Although Germany ranks relatively high in terms of life expectancy, 
longevity has not counterbalanced the influence of persistent low fertility. In our view, 
this raises the possibility that, in certain demographic circumstances, the trend towards 
the further vertical extension of the family may come to a halt, or even be reversed. 
Nevertheless, such a development would not invalidate the concept of verticalisation 
and its associated growth in the height of family constellations. The latter appears to be 
an inseparable aspect of demographic modernisation, but in the stages following and 
preceding a major regime change, there is room for variation, including a reversal of the 
trend.
20 
The fertility patterns in contemporary Europe, which have been described as 
“diverse, delayed and below replacement” (Frejka and Sobotka 2008), suggest that 
more countries may gravitate towards the pattern exemplified by Germany. This 
hypothesis applies to other German-speaking countries and to several nations of 
southern Europe (Tomassini and Wolf 2000). Although fertility levels are no higher in 
many countries of Eastern Europe, it is likely that lower levels of childlessness are 
preventing them from following the same pattern. More conclusive answers about the 
transformation of family constellations must be sought from future surveys, which 
underscores the importance of safeguarding the continuity of internationally 
coordinated data collection on family constellations. But regardless of the outcome, the 
 
20 For the pre-modern period, this phenomenon has been noted in 16th-18th century England by Smith and 
Oeppen (1993). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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structure of the family will continue to exert a significant influence on the lives of 
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Appendix 
Table 1:  Main characteristics of GGS datasets included in the analysis 
  Survey year  Sample size  Age range 
Bulgaria  2004  12858  18–79 
Estonia  2004–05  7855  21–80 
France  2005  10079  18–79 
Georgia  2006  10000  18–79 
Germany   2005  10017  18–79 
Hungary  2004–05  13540  21–78 
Netherlands  2002–04  8161  18–79 
Romania  2005  11986  18–76 
Russia  2004  11261  18–79 
 
Source: GGS database 
 
Table 2:  Selected demographic characteristics of the countries included in the 
analysis, 1950–2005 
  Bulgaria  Estonia  France  Georgia  Germany  Hungary  Netherlands Romania  Russia 
Total fertility rate                 
1950–54  2.48  2.06  2.73  3.00  2.16  2.73  3.06  2.87  2.85 
1955–59  2.27  1.99  2.71  2.91  2.30  2.21  3.10  2.62  2.82 
1960–64  2.18  1.94  2.85  2.98  2.49  1.82  3.17  2.04  2.55 
1965–69  2.15  2.02  2.61  2.61  2.32  1.98  2.80  2.96  2.02 
1970–74  2.17  2.15  2.31  2.60  1.64  2.09  2.06  2.62  2.03 
1975–79  2.17  2.06  1.86  2.39  1.52  2.12  1.60  2.53  1.94 
1980–84  2.01  2.09  1.87  2.27  1.46  1.81  1.52  2.25  2.04 
1985–89  1.92  2.20  1.81  2.26  1.43  1.82  1.56  2.28  2.12 
1990–94  1.51  1.63  1.71  2.05  1.31  1.73  1.58  1.50  1.55 
1995–99  1.22  1.33  1.76  1.72  1.34  1.38  1.60  1.35  1.25 
2000–04  1.25  1.39  1.88  1.58  1.35  1.30  1.73  1.29  1.30 
Life expectancy at birth, males               
1950–54  62.2  61.7  64.1  56.8  65.3  61.5  70.9  59.4  60.5 
1955–59  65.4  64.2  65.9  58.7  66.6  64.7  71.4  62.4  62.5 
1960–64  68.4  65.0  67.2  60.7  67.4  66.4  71.1  65.2  64.1 
1965–69  68.8  65.7  67.6  62.6  67.8  66.7  71.0  65.7  63.8 
1970–74  68.7  65.7  68.6  64.1  67.9  66.5  71.1  66.9  63.1 
1975–79  68.5  64.5  69.5  65.6  69.0  66.3  72.1  67.0  61.9 
1980–84  68.4  64.4  70.6  65.6  70.3  65.3  72.8  66.8  61.4 
1985–89  68.2  65.9  71.9  66.5  71.7  65.5  73.5  66.5  63.8 
1990–94  67.6  62.7  73.1  66.5  72.6  64.8  74.2  65.8  60.5 
1995–99  67.4  63.9  74.4  67.3  73.9  66.4  75.1  66.1  59.6 
2000–04  68.7  65.6  75.8  68.0  75.8  68.3  76.3  67.8  58.5 Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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Table 2:  (Continued) 
  Bulgaria  Estonia  France  Georgia  Germany  Hungary  Netherlands Romania  Russia 
Life expectancy at birth, females             
1950–54  66.1  68.3  69.9  64.4  69.6  65.8  73.4  62.8  67.3 
1955–59  68.8  71.4  72.4  66.4  71.5  69.1  74.7  65.9  69.9 
1960–64  72.1  73.4  74.1  68.3  72.9  71.0  75.8  68.8  72.8 
1965–69  73.1  74.2  75.1  70.3  73.6  71.9  76.4  67.9  73.4 
1970–74  73.4  74.7  76.2  71.8  73.8  72.4  77.0  71.5  73.6 
1975–79  73.6  74.4  77.6  73.2  75.5  72.8  78.6  72.0  73.1 
1980–84  74.2  74.3  78.8  73.2  76.8  73.0  79.5  72.6  72.7 
1985–89  74.7  74.8  80.1  74.0  78.2  73.6  79.9  72.7  73.6 
1990–94  74.7  74.0  81.4  74.3  79.1  73.9  80.2  73.2  72.5 
1995–99  74.6  75.3  82.3  74.7  80.2  75.3  80.5  73.6  72.2 
2000–04  75.6  76.9  83.1  75.0  81.4  76.6  81.0  75.1  71.8 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division database 
 






20–39  40–59  60–79 
Children           
   Bulgaria  76.3  78.3  59.8  90.6  91.0 
   Estonia  78.4  77.5  59.0  90.9  87.4 
   France  73.1  71.9  50.7  86.3  87.1 
   Georgia  77.4  77.3  57.8  90.0  89.1 
   Germany  66.8  64.8  46.5  79.3  76.9 
   Hungary  73.2  72.5  48.7  88.3  87.3 
   Netherlands  69.2  65.5  47.9  78.7  86.3 
   Romania  78.1  73.8  63.2  86.7  83.2 
   Russia  82.1  82.1  65.1  93.7  89.1 
Parent(s)           
   Bulgaria  69.8  65.3  97.4  69.0    8.3 
   Estonia  59.0  62.2  97.0  61.3    5.3 
   France  68.9  70.1  97.9  74.0  16.3 
   Georgia  62.7  62.6  95.9  64.0    5.6 
   Germany  63.8  66.7  96.9  71.5  10.3 
   Hungary  66.4  67.9  97.1  69.9  14.0 
   Netherlands  65.2  65.4  97.2  67.0    9.3 
   Romania  55.0  62.8  95.1  60.1    5.5 
   Russia  60.7  59.7  94.8  59.0    5.3 Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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20–39  40–59  60–79 
Grandchildren           
   Bulgaria  28.7  33.7    0.6  33.5  85.9 
   Estonia  36.0  32.8    0.6  37.0  81.0 
   France  28.8  27.6    0.1  26.6  77.0 
   Georgia  32.8  32.7    0.4  35.6  81.1 
   Germany  34.3  27.1    0.2  21.9  78.1 
   Hungary  32.6  30.5    0.3  33.2  80.1 
   Romania  34.6  28.1    0.3  31.5  75.6 
   Russia  36.5  37.2    0.5  43.0  86.3 
Grandparents           
   Bulgaria  27.6  23.7  53.8    6.9    1.0 
   Estonia  18.1  19.1  46.1    2.7    0.0 
   France  25.3  26.7  60.7    6.6    0.0 
   Georgia  18.4  18.6  45.2    2.7    0.0 
   Germany  17.8  20.2  44.4    4.8    0.2 
   Hungary  na  na  na  na  na 
   Netherlands  17.0  20.7  43.5    2.8    0.1 
   Romania  15.2  20.7  42.5    3.9    0.1 
   Russia  17.6  17.6  44.4    2.7    0.1 
Great-grandchildren         
   Bulgaria    3.5    4.3  ...    0.6  16.4 
   Estonia  na  na  ...  na  na 
   France    2.5    2.5  ...    0.1  10.3 
   Georgia    4.3    4.1  ...    0.3  17.9 
   Germany    1.9    1.7  ...    0.0    6.9 
   Hungary    3.4    3.5  ...    0.2  13.6 
   Netherlands  na  na  ...  na  Na 
   Romania    3.7    3.4  ...    0.1  15.0 
   Russia    4.6    5.2  ...    0.0  21.6 
 
Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations  Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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20–39  40–59  60–79 
1  generation           
   Bulgaria  1.8  2.1  0.4  2.0  4.8 
   Estonia  3.9  3.7  0.4  2.9  10.5 
   France  3.9  3.8  0.3  3.4  10.3 
   Georgia  3.7  3.7  1.0  3.1  9.3 
   Germany  7.8  7.2  1.4  6.3  18.2 
   Romania  6.3  5.3  1.1  5.1  13.5 
   Russia  2.7  2.8  0.9  2.0  7.1 
2 generations           
   Bulgaria  15.7  15.9  14.8  19.3  11.9 
   Estonia  17.6  17.7  18.3  21.8  10.1 
   France  16.0  16.0  14.9  20.2  11.2 
   Georgia  18.4  18.5  20.1  22.1  9.7 
   Germany  24.7  25.0  25.6  28.5  18.4 
   Romania  18.6  18.9  17.8  24.2  12.2 
   Russia  16.7  16.3  16.6  20.7  8.9 
3 generations           
   Bulgaria  61.0  61.4  57.7  56.5  75.9 
   Estonia  62.7  62.5  60.7  56.2  75.4 
   France  59.6  60.0  58.9  56.1  66.2 
   Georgia  60.7  60.4  57.4  54.3  76.9 
   Germany  54.7  54.5  56.1  50.9  57.8 
   Romania  61.0  60.9  59.8  54.5  70.5 
   Russia  61.8  62.5  59.0  55.0  79.4 
4+ generations           
   Bulgaria  21.5  20.6  27.2  22.2  7.5 
   Estonia  15.9  16.1  20.6  19.2  4.0 
   France  20.4  20.1  25.9  20.3  12.2 
   Georgia  17.1  17.3  21.5  20.5  4.1 
   Germany  12.9  13.3  16.9  14.3  5.6 
   Romania  14.1  14.9  21.4  16.1  3.8 
   Russia  18.9  18.5  23.5  22.2  4.6 
 
Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 4 
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Table 5:  Anchor’s position in the family and the prevalence of 






20–39  40–59  60–79 
Youngest           
   Bulgaria  20.8  18.5  39.9  6.8  0.3 
   Estonia  17.1  18.6  40.9  5.5  0.4 
   France  22.6  24.0  49.1  9.8  1.7 
   Georgia  18.5  18.6  41.1  6.6  0.6 
   Germany  24.2  26.8  52.2  13.4  2.1 
   Romania  14.5  20.2  35.5  7.6  0.8 
   Russia  13.9  13.8  33.8  3.5  0.4 
Middle           
   Bulgaria  49.6  47.4  58.1  62.8  8.7 
   Estonia  43.9  44.4  56.4  57.6  5.2 
   France  46.8  46.4  49.2  64.6  14.8 
   Georgia  44.6  44.3  55.3  57.7  5.0 
   Germany  39.8  40.0  44.9  58.3  8.4 
   Romania  40.8  43.0  60.1  52.8  4.8 
   Russia  46.6  46.2  61.4  55.6  5.1 
Oldest           
   Bulgaria  27.8  31.9  1.6  28.4  86.2 
   Estonia  35.2  33.3  2.3  34.0  83.9 
   France  26.7  25.8  1.4  22.2  73.1 
   Georgia  33.2  33.3  2.7  32.5  85.1 
   Germany  28.3  26.0  1.6  22.0  71.4 
   Romania  38.4  31.6  3.4  34.4  81.0 
   Russia  36.8  37.2  3.9  38.9  87.4 
Solo           
   Bulgaria  1.8  2.1  0.4  2.0  4.8 
   Estonia  3.8  3.7  0.4  2.9  10.5 
   France  3.9  3.8  0.3  3.4  10.4 
   Georgia  3.8  3.7  0.9  3.1  9.3 
   Germany  7.7  7.3  1.3  6.2  18.2 
   Romania  6.3  5.3  1.0  5.2  13.5 
   Russia  2.7  2.8  0.9  2.0  7.1 Puur et al.: Intergenerational family constellations in contemporary Europe 
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20–39  40–59  60–79 
Multigenerational ties         
   Bulgaria  55.9  56.8  54.4  39.3  86.1 
   Estonia  59.6  56.8  52.5  45.9  85.5 
   France  54.6  54.7  61.7  33.1  77.4 
   Georgia  51.1  51.2  45.6  37.8  81.4 
   Germany  41.7  42.1  45.1  22.1  63.3 
   Romania  49.6  48.7  42.7  34.9  75.9 
   Russia  55.1  55.2  45.3  46.5  87.2 
 
Source: GGS database, authors’ calculations 
 